

OGC 8-0066

9 January 1958

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD****SUBJECT: Briefing of CIA Subcommittee of the House Armed  
Services Committee - 6 January 1958****1. Those present included:**

**Committee Members:** Chairman Carl Vinson, Representatives  
Overton Brooks, Paul J. Kilday, Leslie C. Arends,  
Leon H. Gavin, and Walter Norblad. (Carl Durham  
was unable to attend.)

**Staff:** Robert W. Smart, Chief Counsel and John R. Blandford,  
Counsel.

**CIA:** The Director of Central Intelligence, Messrs. Amory,  
Scoville and Warner.

2. It was explained that the Director had to attend a NSC meeting and would be a few minutes late but that if the Chairman had no objection, Mr. Amory would proceed with the prepared statement. This was agreeable with the Chairman. The Chairman made a statement that all present were certainly aware of the sensitivity of the information to be presented and that the security of the facts to be disclosed was important to the nation and should be closely guarded by those present.

3. Mr. Amory explained that the material which was to be presented was substantially the same material given to the Johnson Subcommittee but that in view of national estimates approved in the period of time since those hearings this material had been brought up to date. It was explained, of course, that the questions and answers at the previous hearing had not been incorporated into this presentation.

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4. Mr. Amory completed the introduction and the general economic background. Mr. Dulles then arrived and started presentation of the general scientific background beginning on page 5 of the prepared statement. The Director again indicated to those present that the material to be presented was substantially that presented to the Johnson Subcommittee but brought up to date in light of the intelligence community actions in the preceding period.

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7. Mr. Smart attempted to explain the relative positions of the U. S. and the Soviets in the missile field by indicating that the large size of nuclear weapons a few years back was an extremely limiting factor in developing a missile to carry such weights. In fact the thrust needed was so far ahead of the foreseeable technical capabilities that in the U. S. work on the missiles was postponed until research was able to bring down the size and weight of the necessary nuclear warheads. On the other hand, the Soviets, despite no foreseeable break-through on the size and weight problem, took a calculated gamble and went ahead with development of a missile for a much smaller and lighter warhead. Mr. Smart asked Mr. Dulles if this was a fair explanation but Mr. Dulles could not agree that this was an entirely correct explanation. It is true, however, that this problem was a delaying factor in initiating the

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U. S. program, while the Soviets may have proceeded developing ballistic missiles without having a small weight high yield warhead in development.

8. Mr. Brooks asked the question of our ability to get into the Soviet Union citing Senator Ellender's recent trip where he was able to move around somewhat freely and did take extensive films.

[REDACTED] It was pointed out to Mr. Brooks that we had a debriefing session with Mr. Ellender and also had reviewed all of his films.

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9. Mr. Vinson and Mr. Smart indicated the tentative agenda for conducting their investigation. It was to be divided into two phases. The first phase dealt with missiles. They proposed to start off on 10 January at 10 o'clock with a one hour familiarization on the American family of missiles to be conducted by Brig. Gen. Betts of the office of Mr. Holoday. At 11 o'clock it was proposed that the DCI conduct a briefing of the Russian capabilities. Thereafter they would have Secretary McElroy, General Twining and the three Service Secretaries and the three Service heads. After the missile phase was accomplished they would then go through generally the same procedure as to other aspects including other weapons systems and organizational matters.

10. Mr. Vinson explained the necessity of Mr. Dulles appearing before the full Committee and his difficulties if Mr. Dulles were not to appear. Mr. Arends commented that a great deal of what Mr. Dulles had stated could be read in the newspapers and he thought that the Director should testify before the full group. Mr. Vinson took a poll of all members present as to whether Mr. Dulles should appear before the full group. They all agreed with minor qualifications.

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11. Mr. Kilday expanded on his earlier qualification to the effect that the first witnesses at a hearing drew the headlines and drew questions which are not appropriate to the responsibilities of the witness. Mr. Kilday's comments were directed both at General Betts' appearance and Mr. Dulles' appearance. In the alternative, Mr. Kilday felt the politically responsible leaders should be called first and that they should

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start off with persons such as Secretary McElroy and General Twining. After considerable discussion, this approach was adopted. In effect, on the 10th of January Mr. Smart will attempt to brief the group on the American family of missiles utilizing General Betts for technical assistance and the rest of the meeting of the Committee would be devoted to discussions of agenda, etc. The official hearings would start on Monday, January 13. There was no firm statement of when Mr. Dulles would be expected to come to appear. (It is to be hoped, however, that after hearing from numerous Defense officials the full Committee will feel that it has sufficient information and the Agency may not be called at all.) In fact the Director suggested at one point that the Committee could get this information from Defense since they have everything that we have on the subject. This was not agreed to.

12. Consistent with prior practice, the Security Office conducted a technical sweep of the hearing room and a Security officer was in the area during the entire hearing.

SIGNED

JOHN S. WARNER  
Legislative Counsel

cc: DCI

DD/S

Leg. C.

Col. GREEN

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